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A basic, though usually implicit, assumption of neoclassical demand theory is that consuming 
households are indifferent about the provenance or source of the goods and services they buy 
and consume.  Given the information at  their  disposal,  their  preferences,  and their  incomes,  
households are assumed to choose quantity and quality by reference to prices (including the 
various costs of transacting). This does not mean that some characteristics of suppliers are not,  
at least in the short run, of importance for an understanding of consumption behavior. We now 
recognize that reputation (Shapiro,  1983) is  a characteristic  of firms that has an impact on  
demand. Others, such as the color and ethnicity of suppliers, may also be of significance. If we  
neglect these factors, the assumption simply says that there is competition among all suppliers,  
or that phenomena such as firm and brand loyalty do not repeal the law of demand.
Albert Breton 
Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance, pp. 284
I.     Introduction
For  some  consecutive  days  in  May  2006,  students  of  two  Dhaka-based  private 
universities  demonstrated  on  the  streets  of  Dhaka,  the  capital  of  Bangladesh,  against  the 
administrations of their respective universities. They alleged administrative mismanagement and 
lack  of  adequate  educational  facilities,  as  well  as  “exorbitant”  tuition  fees.  The  students’ 
dissatisfaction was from a shared opinion amongst them that they did not receive educational and 
other facilities as “promised” during their admission. The tide of demonstrations stemmed within 
a few days only after the administrations of these two universities reached some agreements with 
the students regarding resolving the contentious issues. Meanwhile newspapers ran front-page 
headlines  and  the  simmering  debate  regarding  public  university  versus  private  university 
education flared up in the forefront of public discussions. 
Albert Breton’s discussion on an implicit assumption of neoclassical demand theory has 
found  some  sort  of  significance  in  the  case  of  HE  sector  in  Bangladesh  circa  2006.  That 
households, while placing their demands, to a large extent, are not perturbed by the identity of 
the supplier (read public or private), with exception only in the case of reputation, as long as they 
can obtain the desired quality and quantity of the product-- this has been exposed by recent 
incidences in this sector. Extension of the logic implies that dissatisfaction is expected to follow 
if households consider themselves somewhat deceived in the marketplace. 
The objective of the paper is to discuss the ongoing public university-private university 
debate in Bangladesh and attempt to shed some lights on the issue. This debate centers on a 
number of core issues. Firstly,  should HE sector in a developing country like Bangladesh be 
entirely provided for by solely public universities, or by private universities or a combination of 
the two? Secondly, should Bangladesh opt for the third option in the first issue (as is indeed the 
case)-- which entails a transition from a traditional subsidized public provision framework to a 
more market-responsive provision framework-- would there be a need for a strong supervisory 
role from UGC during this transition,  or no such role would be required? Thirdly,  given the 
second issue is resolved in the affirmative, what factors would UGC need to concentrate on in 
order to secure a strong supervisory role for itself? 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses recent trends in the sector 
as  well  as  the  background  of  these  recent  trends.  Section  III  concentrates  on  the  apparent 
weakness  of  UGC  in  solving  the  problems  afflicting  the  HE  sector  and  discusses  political 
economic explanations behind this weakness. Section IV outlines some plausible roles of UGC. 
Concluding remarks are placed in Section IV.  
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II.   Recent Trends in the HE Sector & a Brief Background Sketch
The history of public universities in this land dates back to 1921. University of Dhaka 
was the first public university in this region, which was established in 1921. During the Pakistan 
period  of  1947-1971--this  university  contributed  enormously  in  the  formation  of  a  highly 
educated  middle  class  community  in  East  Pakistan.  The  university  was  the  main  center  of 
advanced education as well as political  activism-- this activism was gaining momentum over 
time through different stages of development. It was not possible for the faculty and students of 
University  of  Dhaka to  keep  them entirely  detached  from the  political  developments  in  the 
province in these formative decades of the Pakistani state. In a broader canvass, in a densely 
populated  region  plagued  by  poverty  and  illiteracy  vis-à-vis  unfair  transfer  of  economic 
resources to the center and lack of representation of Bengalis in every sphere of the state-- the 
people of the region always looked up to the faculty and students of this particular university for 
ideological as well as political directions. 
Much of the problems that are faced by HE sector today in Bangladesh owes to the fact 
that this sector historically had had to take an active political role in the national sphere besides 
strictly academic exercises-- in order to restore the balance of power on behalf of the people vis-
à-vis other stakeholders and interest groups, mainly the military and the bureaucracy. Even now, 
after 16 years of continued practice of parliamentary democracy since the fall of the autocratic 
rule by a mass upsurge in 1990-- public universities have retained a major supportive role in the 
national politics, besides their academic practices-- oftentimes at the cost of the latter. The fallout 
is  that--  student  associations  and teachers’  associations  have  actually  formed  some  form of 
patron-client  relationships  with  various  political  parties,  both  parties-in-power  or  opposition 
ones-- here patron being the parties and clients being students and teachers-- which is causing a 
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detrimental effect on the quality of education being provided by the public universities. There are 
cases of external political influences in the assignments to the positions of the Vice Chancellors-- 
and  there  are  allegations  of  influences  on  the  recruitment  processes  of  the  faculty  and 
administrative officers. Political considerations, not merit,  have, in some cases, become more 
important in the calculations of assigning even a faculty job. On the administration side, one 
needs to mention that public universities are run by the “University Sovereignty Act 1973”. They 
are supervised by the UGC, which provides them with a major share of their respective budgets 
from the public fund, and they manage to raise some funds themselves from various fees and 
business interests owned by them. One key feature of these public universities is that their tuition 
fees are massively subsidized and therefore they are highly oversubscribed, regardless of issues 
related to the quality or quantity aspects of HE.  
The private universities in Bangladesh is actually a entirely new phenomenon dating back 
only to 1992 with the formulation of the “Private Universities Act 1992”1. The background of 
this act was an ever-growing demand for HE being unmatched by a limited supply by public 
universities with government being cautious of a larger subsidy that would have been needed for 
this sector in case of a supply expansion. Under the dominant trend of the day, that of increased 
public-private cooperation in many sectors of the economy-- the government welcomed private 
initiatives  in  this  sector.  Ostensibly  the  argument  was  to  inject  competition  in  the  sector--
underlying  was  the  assumption  that  private  universities  would  be  self-financed  creating  no 
pressure on public expenditure.  A large number of university-going students were opting for 
1 Under this Act, student politics is prohibited in the private universities. Their educational planning and curricula 
are to be pre-approved by the University Grants Commission. Initially there has to be at least two Faculties and 
qualified teachers and a deposit of TK. 5 crore amount has to be maintained in a bank in the university’s name. A 
permanent campus has to be constructed within 5 years’ time after inauguration over at least a 5-acre land property. 
A  5  per  cent  of  the  total  student  seats  have  to  be  provided  with  tuition  waiver,  which  will  be  for  poor  and 
meritorious  students.  A Board  of  Governors  and  a  Vice  Chancellor  will  direct  the overall  administration.  The 
university has to be a non-profit entity.
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foreign universities at that time which was creating a pressure on foreign exchange reserve--
government expected to partially arrest the outflow of foreign currency by this cooperation with 
the  private  sector.  Now,  in  2006,  Bangladesh  has  a  vibrant  HE sector  with  as  many as  77 
universities-- 23 of them public and the remaining 54 private (see Appendix). The number of 
institutions  and  students  in  the  private  universities  has  increased  substantially  over  time.  A 
number of foreign universities are sending their representatives to Dhaka on a regular basis or 
setting up local campuses-- indications of a huge market potential for HE. 
Opening  up  of  private  universities  has  raised  enthusiasms  among  the  Bangladeshi 
expatriates with foreign degrees who now can consider returning home with the prospect of 
academic or administrative positions along with handsome salary packages. Bangladeshi foreign 
graduates, on their return home, are contributing enormously in the development of this sector. 
On the negative side, tuition fees in the private universities are substantially higher as compared 
to those in public universities. In addition, the authorities arbitrarily set these tuition fees in the 
absence of any proper guideline from the UGC. One would need to keep in mind that while 
public  universities  are  hugely  public  funded--private  universities  are  entirely  self-financed. 
Private universities do provide financial assistance for a section of its’ student body, as per the 
Act of 1992. Another problem is that, barring from some top private universities, educational 
facilities as well as campus facilities are inadequate in most of them, since most of them are only 
in the formative stages of development. A number of key features of these private universities 
need to be mentioned. One particular feature of these universities is that they do not allow for 
formation of formal elected student and teachers’ associations, as per the Act of 1992-- which 
reduces the possibility of external national–level political influences. The adverse impact is that, 
students  and faculty do not  have any appropriate  outlet  for registering their  demands  in  the 
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absence of elected bodies-- this constrains their representations over decision making. A second 
feature is that private universities are required to be “non-profit entities” by the Act of 1992. This 
is a technicality at best-- this does not prevent them from behaving in an unrestricted profit-
seeking manner. A third feature is that, by the Act of 1992, a Vice Chancellor and a Board of 
Governors  are  required  to  oversee  the  proper  functioning  of  each of  these  institutions.  This 
Board  largely  consists  of  the  founding  donors--  wealthy  industrialists  and  businesspersons, 
retired bureaucrats, and so on. It is the Board of Governors who takes ultimate decisions, over all 
concerns, including recruitment and termination of faculty and staff. Therefore these universities 
are not run on a truly representative basis-- rather on the basis of policies formulated by the 
founding donors, a group of people who need even not be academics in the first place. 
Only one common body supervises both the public and the private universities in the 
country-- that is the University Grants Commission (UGC), except for some role played by the 
Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh. 
 III. Weakness of the UGC: By Accident, or By Design? 
The UGC can be coined as the only formal regulator of the HE sector in Bangladesh. In 
the face of a de jure autonomy of the public universities and fiscal independence of the private 
universities-- it  is the only the UGC who plays a role, and who has the potential  to play an 
enhanced role in this sector, if need arises. Nonetheless, there are some other informal regulators 
in this sector as well. The first of these informal regulators is the market. The market directly 
enters  into  the  demand  function  of  a  private  university,  which  is  by its  very nature  mostly 
market-driven. It is possible to argue that market will, at least in the long run if not necessarily in 
the short run, determine the size of a private university. A private university rarely will venture 
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to open a department from which revenue collection is expected to be negative— it is possible 
for them to open departments as such, so long it can hope to compensate for the revenue loss 
from the department  by improvements in some other avenues, such as  reputation among the 
populace  and even then,  there  is  a limit  to  cross-subsidization  that  would be possible.   The 
market does not directly enter into the demand function of the public universities, which are 
receivers of subsidies from the government-- the tuition fees are lowered to such an extent that 
there has always been an over-subscription. Still the market plays an indirect role in the form of 
reputation and public opinion in these universities. An allegation of a low quality of HE service 
provision  (from  the  media  and  public  opinion)  may  not  necessarily  reduce  the  budget 
immediately-- but surely it may reduce the bargaining position of a public university vis-à-vis the 
UGC and the government. In summary, a private university faces the UGC (only in the form of 
instructions and permissions) along with the market with its full force-- whilst a public university 
faces only the UGC in the bargaining table over budgetary allocations. 
Now, if we concentrate on the development of UGC in Bangladesh, we notice that the 
organizational structure and capacity of this institution has not evolved over time, whereas its 
functions has increased drastically after the introduction of the private universities in HE sector 
in 1992. The UGC in its organizational structure has leading educationists of the country-- but all 
of them are from the public universities, none from the private. As long as we acknowledge that 
the  private  universities  function  differently  from  the  public  ones,  it  is  expected  that  some 
representative educationists with experiences in private universities need to be included in its 
membership-- which has not happened till now. It has been reported that the number of staff has 
not changed over time while now they have to deal with a number of 75 compared to a previous 
number of 24. One may be excused to suspect whether the service quality of the UGC as a 
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regulator itself has deteriorated over time, if one places the case that the UGC has been found to 
be moving much slower compared to the fast pace of time. 
The UGC has taken some concrete steps in improving the situations in both the public 
and private  university sub-sectors. In 2004, it  has scrutinized all  the private  universities  and 
issued  notices  on  eight  of  them  on  the  ground  of  inadequate  educational  facilities  and/or 
environment.  In 2005, all  the vice-chancellors of 75 universities  have come to agreement  to 
introduce uniform grading system, under the umbrella of the UGC. Progress is  being made over 
these issues till now. Still these measures seem to be inadequate for bringing welcome change in 
the sector where both the public and the private sub-sectors have their own set of problems.
One can say that, if the UGC has been found to be incapable of solving the problems of 
the HE sector or giving proper directions, one plausible option is to invigorate the UGC, since 
one would rule out the other more extreme solution of abolishing the UGC altogether. One needs 
to apply some caution in this regard. It is not exactly the point to provide some suggestions to the 
UGC to consider and if it  finds agreeable, to implement.  It is also important for us to try to 
understand the underlying factors that may have contributed to the failure of a regulator in its’ 
job. In a public policy discussion, it is needed that one considers the political economy aspect as 
well. In essence, one needs to move away from the notion of a benevolent state waiting to give 
solutions for each of our ills-- one needs to look into the discussions of the competitive states à la 
Albert Breton where different stakeholders are constantly in competition with each other inside 
the state to maximize their own narrow self-interests rather than the interests of the mass people 
as it is ostensibly projected. It is entirely possible that a regulator may fail the job as a regulator 
entirely  by  accident,  or  it  is  possible  that  the  regulator  may  fail  by  design,  such  as  other 
stakeholders may have interests in failing the regulator and have managed to influence the state 
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in such a way that the regulator has been assigned jobs or assignments in such a manner that this 
is bound to fail. For example, in a parliamentary democracy like Bangladesh, do the political 
parties  have  much  interest  in  seeing  the  UGC to  be  able  to  control  and/or  nullify  external 
political influences over the public universities? In Bangladesh, the mass people have always 
looked up to the universities with awe and admiration and waited for advise from them, as much 
as in 1971 as even now--given that only the fortunate and meritorious few among them can reach 
up to these institutions.  The public universities  have therefore always  been important  power 
centers-- to be able to have some control over the functioning of these institutions sends a signal 
among  the  masses  about  the  strength  of  the  political  party  in  question.  Since  the  private 
universities do not have the political  value till  now-- they have managed to keep themselves 
away from the politicians. The private universities have raised interests among a different but 
very  much  related  group  of  players--  these  are  the  business  community  as  well  as  rich 
philanthropists. The private universities have been set up mostly with generous funds from this 
community--  there  is  a  social  prestige  value  that  is  involved  in  being  associated  with  a 
university; we may safely rule out the profit motives behind it, since private universities are non-
profit organizations. The business community does not have much incentive to accommodate for 
a strong UGC either. A strong UGC may bargain itself into a position where it can actually have 
scrutiny powers over the functioning of the private universities. This may directly reduce the 
power  and authority  of  the  business  community  that  it  enjoys  over  the  private  universities. 
Therefore two very important stakeholders in a “parliamentary democracy” like in Bangladesh, 
have much interests in common in seeing a weak UGC lacking in proper representations as well 
as  incapable  of  pursuing  any  concrete  policy  directions  due  to  political  pressures  from all 
directions. If we dare to delve further, we can even suggest that the most important political 
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economic element in a country like Bangladesh (moving away from state provision of public 
goods towards public-private cooperation-based provision of public goods) is the interests of the 
rapidly expanding business community whereas politicians act as their agents in terms of power 
capturing and policy-making. It is possible in Bangladesh that the business community does not 
have much interests in a very vibrant public university sector (returns from this sector to them is 
minimal)  whereas  they  are  interested  to  have  a  large  amount  of  control  over  the  rapidly 
expanding private university sector (returns from this sector to them is significant-- if not exactly 
in monetary valuations, but in terms of social prestige and real or perceived influence over the 
civil  society).  Let us formulate one particular game plan on behalf the principal stakeholders 
(with respect to a particular industry): the business community shows interests in one particular  
set of rules of the game over all possible rules of the game for the regulator of an industry-- the 
political parties act as their agents in the political market to popularize this particular rule in the 
disguise of some politically appropriate and voter sensitive agenda, come to power or wait for 
return to power, pass the rules through the parliament, and then it comes down to the regulator to 
implement that particular set of rules of the game. If we on principle agree with this particular 
political game--in that case it should not surprise us that the UGC has been found to be caught 
unaware and under-prepared to play its expected role in this transitional phase in HE sector in 
Bangladesh (1992 till now). Notwithstanding the level of sincerity and integrity of the members 
of the UGC (in general,  any regulator)--  the effort  will  not bring good results  if  we do not 
counter the adverse effects that could leak into the functioning of the UGC from the political 
economic point of view. 
One way to counter the political economic circle like this is to have a strengthened civil 
society  along  with  an  alert  print  media.  These  two  stakeholders  in  the  society  can  raise 
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consciousness among the populace, particularly the middle class community. A pressure in that 
case will be mounted on the government to provide more power to the UGC which is the only 
regulator in the HE sector in order to protect public interests.                      
IV. Some Plausible Roles of the UGC
Keeping the political economic scenario in mind, we now concentrate on what could be 
the focus of the UGC in tackling the problems in the HE sector. One way to formulate this issue 
is  to  have  a  production  function  for  higher  education  (following  Schwartz,  Stiefel  and 
Rubenstein 1998), 
Q= f(X1, X2, ….. …., Xn) … …….. …. …. …… ……… ……… ……….. ……(1)  
where Q represents the quantity of output, X1, X2, ….. …., Xn are the n inputs to production and 
f(.) captures the transformation linking them. This is a standard production function of very 
general form, which will actually suffice for our present purpose. One difficulty in using this 
production function for the purpose of education is that it relies on the assumption that input and 
output  measures  reflect  points  on  a  production  function.  A problem is  that  validity  of  this 
assumption depends upon the incentives and objectives of administrative policy makers of the 
universities.  While  a  profit-maximizing  firm  in  a  competitive  market  choose  to  produce 
efficiently  (on  the  production  function),  universities  that  we  are  considering  can  rarely  be 
considered  either  profit-maximizing  or  operating  in  a  competitive  market,  since  most 
universities have some monopoly power and may pursue a plethora of political and economic 
objectives.  The implication  is  that  the observed data  are  likely not  to  be on the production 
frontier. A second problem of a production function formulation of higher education is that how 
to measure or consider outputs. In manufacturing firms, it is easy to identify the output-- that is 
the  product;  while  in  education  it  is  not  so  simple.  Education  has  multiple  objectives  and 
11
multiple outputs. Universities may seek to produce graduates who are particularly well-trained 
for public sector jobs, or private sector jobs, or pursuing independent businesses, or they may 
seek to produce graduates who obtain placements in foreign universities for higher education—
or their objective may be to produce graduates with a minimum level of competency. A third 
problem is that there are two aspects of university education, one is quantity and the other one is 
quality.  Is it  difficult  to consider quality aspects (say,  how much well trained a graduate is) 
separate from quantity aspects (say,  what degree did the graduate obtain). The third point is 
crucial for out discussion since while the quantity aspect is easily visible-- the quality aspect is 
not; yet the it is the quality aspect that is very important for a graduate’s career path. Much of 
the public concerns about the HE sector is not whether there are sufficient numbers of graduates 
that it is turning out every year; but whether it is turning out the graduates with an adequate 
quality of higher education. I propose that this is the particular point where the sole regulator in 
the sector (read the UGC) would need to concentrate. 
 In order to complete the picture, we mention that the demand for higher education is from 
the households who are  limited  by their  financial  resources  in  their  ability  to  buy education 
services  and private  goods (Schwartz  et  all.,  op.  cit.).  A simple  budget  constraint  for  the ith 
household is: 
 PXXi + PEE = II …………………………………………………………………….(2)
  --where PE is the price of education, PX is the price of private goods and II is the income of the ith 
household. 
Now, there are three questions that need to be resolved. Firstly, if it is entirely possible to 
have a market solution by working with the supply curve from equation (1) and the demand 
curve from equation (2)-- in that case, holding all other things constant, what role is there for a 
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regulator (read the UGC) in the HE sector to play? Surely,  one can say,  the market is being 
solved by voluntary market  exchange.  The answer to this  particular  query is  that,  actually a 
supervisory authority like the UGC will still  be needed to be present. The reason is that  the 
amount of expenditure on HE that a particular household would like to have on its son/daughter 
(or it may be a case of self-finance) will depend on the household’s evaluation of the education 
product that it is purchasing and its expectation of future income flows that would be generated 
from this education product. Problem is household does not know its future whereas even more 
serious problem is that household does not have the full information about the particular HE 
product is it  purchasing. Household therefore suffers from both uncertainty of future income 
flows  and  incomplete  information  regarding  the  HE  product  that  it  wants  to  purchase 
(particularly  the quality  of inputs  and quality  of outputs)--  also we assume that  information 
gathering is costly. Therefore the market fails from the demand side problems-- here enters the 
regulator as a representative from the government to ameliorate these failures, if not be able to 
fully resolve them.  
A second question is that why would a government need to resort to the market in the 
first place, why the government does not supply the full amount of HE sector itself. Again I refer 
to the discussion of non-profit organizations (private universities in our debate are actually non-
profits) put forward by Albert Breton (op. cit., pp. 280-282). Breton refers to Weisbrod (1988) 
for explanation of the existence of non-profit organizations. Simply stated, Weisbrod explains, 
“nonprofit  organizations  exist  to  provide  collective-type  goods  in  quantities  and  qualities  
different from what is provided by governments, which in democracies, Weisbrod assumes, must  
respond to the interests of the majority. In other words, the nonprofit sector exists to respond to  
a  greater  diversity  of  demand  than  the  governmental  sector  can  satisfy  because  of  the  
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majoritarian constraint to which it is bound. Weisbrod recognizes that to fulfill that function,  
nonprofit organizations will have to address and resolve a free-rider problem and that in fact  
they  do  (Weisbrod,  1988,  pp.  25-31).”  Non-profit  organizations  are  sources  of  product 
differentiation whose role is to satisfy diversified demand. These kinds of organizations are more 
efficient in providing for some certain goods and services-- compared to a public organizations, 
their efficiency is due to the reason that they can solve the free-rider problem in a better way and 
also they can ascertain the particular demand functions from the consumers in a better way. Here 
lies one way of reasoning of the need for existence of private universities in the HE sector along 
with the public ones-- that  a private university can provide for greater care and precision in 
assessment of demand and avoid free-rider problem (read subsidy) compared to a similar size of 
a public one.    
One last query would be where should a supervisory body like the UGC concentrate its 
attention in the HE sector. I  propose that the basic principle would be to concentrate on the 
quality  and quantity  of  the  input  side  of  equation  (1).  My argument  is  as  follows,  when a 
university is admitting a student-- the implicit understanding is that it is promising to provide 
some particular  amounts of inputs (both quality and quantity)  which,  in association with the 
student’s own level of effort and merit and time-- will be converted into a visible output for the 
student (say, a degree)-- in return the student is promising to pay tuition and other fees. Nowhere 
a university will give an assurance of a pre-specified output (say, the student may fail the obtain 
the degree). What this implies is that, the implicit contract between a student and a university is 
an exchange of fees (from the student) for inputs (for the university)—not exactly to do with 
outputs. Each of the parties can hold each other responsible in case of failure of the agreement. 
Moral hazard may enter in this context unless the contract negotiations and the delivery process 
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is  strictly  under  supervision.  A regulator  in  this  case  is  essential.  Also  for  this  reason,  the 
regulator  will  concentrate  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  inputs  and  design  instruments  for 
incentivizing this service delivery and imposing sanctions in case of failure.       
V. Conclusion
In a developing country like Bangladesh, where governments are now allowing private 
non-profit enterprises to enter and play a supportive role--it can be considered to be a transitional 
phase for  that  particular  sector.  To safeguard citizens’  interests  in  these times  of  change of 
guards,  a strong supervisory umbrella  (i.e.,  the UGC) is  required--  otherwise there could be 
social costs from this transition. This paper has discussed this particular issue with a particular 
focus on the role of the UGC in Bangladesh during 1992-2006. The conclusion of the discussion 
is that a strong supervisory role is very much required from the UGC and also at the same time, 
the civil society and the media would also need to mobilize themselves so that undue advantages 
are not channeled out to some particular interest groups at the greater cost of the society.   
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Appendix
Table 1.    Number of Public and Private Universities, Number of Teachers and Number of Students in   
Bangladesh, 2001-2006 
Number of Institutions2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Public1 14 14 17 22 22 22 23
Private 16 22 41 48 51 52 54
Number of Teachers
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Public 5793 5093 5241 5603 6005 6005 6069
Private 3871 1644 2335 2734 4543 4543 4592
Number of Students
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Public 81066 86219 92562 99474 104350 104350 105467
Private 13192 35968 28125 32927 44224 44224 44697
Source. Bangladesh Arthonoitik Somikkha 2006, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, pp.  
226 
Note. 
1  Public  universities  include  both  general  and  technical  (agricultural,  engineering,  Islamic,  medical, 
science and technology) categories while no private university is listed as technical. 
2 The higher education sector also has general category public and private colleges as well as technical 
category public colleges. The total number of medical colleges, both public and private, was 27 in 2006 
whilst 21 in 2000.
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